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Judicially Reducing the Standard of Care:
An Analysis of the Bad Faith/Gross Misjudgment
Standard in Special Education Discrimination
Drew Millari
INTRODUCTION
F OURTEEN percent of elementary and secondary education students
in public schools were served by disability programs in 2003-2004.2
More than eleven percent of undergraduates at American colleges reported
having a disability.3  Each disabled student, to some degree, requires
special attention and programs to allow them the opportunity to receive an
adequate education. Congress has recognized this need and has enacted
legislation requiring schools to provide these students with the services
they need.4 However, several courts have applied standards that have
all but destroyed the teeth of these statutes and left disabled students
practically without a remedy.'
Education law-like most other legal subjects-is a complex field that
cannot be summed up in a single standard or set of rules. Laws passed
by Congress in this area range from statutes proscribing the handling, and
inherent privacy, of student records, 6 to statutes forbidding discrimination
based on a child's disability.7
In an effort to simplify the law (or possibly due to a misunderstanding
of the law) some courts have employed standards created for one purpose
to an entirely different set of circumstances. More specifically, standards
that were put forth to evaluate decisions of educational professionals when
choosing from a set of possible alternatives have been adapted to evaluate
the general treatment of handicapped students in entirely different sets of
1 B.A. History, 2005, Brigham Young University; J.D. expected 2008 University of
Kentucky College of Law. The Author would like to thank his wife Ashlee and son Mac for
their support during this process.
2 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS, 2005, at 81 (2oo6), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2oo6/2oo6o3o_2a.pdf.
3 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATES
IN U.S. POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS: 2003-o4, at 133-34 (2OO6), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2oo6/2oo6I84.pdf.
4 See infra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 127-51 and accompanying text.
6 20 U.S.C. § I232g (2000).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
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circumstances. These developments have confused the law and created an
uncertain environment for future litigants because of the unstable nature
of judicial opinions. Thus, parents of disabled students are left little in the
way of recourse or remedy in these circumstances. An increasing number
of courts are providing great-and sometimes absolute-deference to state
officials in making decisions regarding the educating of disabled students.'
This Note will examine a new trend among some circuits to heighten the
standard of liability of educational professionals and make the road steeper
and more complicated for America's disabled students who feel they are
not being given an appropriate education by their local school board.
After an illustration, Part I of this Note will examine congressional
legislation that has been enacted to provide disabled students access to
free appropriate public education. Part II will follow the evolution of
the law in this area, and the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard from
the case of Monahan v. Nebraska9 will be discussed in detail. Next, Part
II.C & D will examine the treatment of this standard in other circuits
with special emphasis on how the Sixth Circuit has applied Monahan, and
how this standard has provided extra-statutory protection for educational
professionals. Last, Part III will examine alternatives to using the bad
faith/gross misjudgment standard, and the merits of each alternative.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Illustration
The difficulty of succeeding in special education discrimination cases can
be shown by the results of two very similar cases.'0 In these cases, schools
refused to administer prescribed dosages of Ritalin to students with
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) because it was contrary
to policies adopted by their respective schools. The schools' employees
were not allowed to administer dosages of Ritalin in excess of maximum
suggested amounts put forth in the Physician's Desk Reference, whether
or not the student had a prescription for such an amount and whether or not
the parents had consented to the administration of the drug."
Kelly DeBord was an eight-year-old elementary student with ADHD.l2
She was given one hundred milligrams of Ritalin each morning before she
8 See infra notes 39-I 26 and accompanying text.
9 Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 E2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982).
io Davis v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 104 F3d 204 (8th Cir. 1997). See generally Thomas
Simmons, The ADA Prima Face Plaintiff: A Critical Overview of Eighth Circuit Case Law, 47
DRAKE L. REV. 761 (1999) (citing these cases to demonstrate a similar point).
i i See DeBord v. Board of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant School Dist., 126 F.3d 1102, 1 104
(8th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Francis Howell School Dist., 1o4 E3d 204, 205 (8th Cir. 1997).
i2 DeBord, 1z6 F3d at IO3-04.
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left for school, but required a second dose of forty milligrams at 3:00 pm
while still in school.'3 The school nurse refused to administer the drug
because of the school's policy regarding the Physician's Desk Reference. 4
Shane Davis also has ADHD and in 1996 required 360 milligrams of Ritalin
per day to enable him to participate in school activities and to prevent his
disorder from causing a significant problem." After two years, the nurse at
the school noticed that the dose was well above the recommended amount
put forth in the Physician's Desk Reference and expressed her concern to
Shane's mother.1 6 At the suggestion of the nurse, Mrs. Davis got a second
opinion about the dosage, and the second doctor confirmed that 360
milligrams was an appropriate dosage for Shane. 7 The nurse nonetheless
decided to stop assisting in the administration of the drug, and Shane's
mother was forced to come to the school once or twice a day to help Shane
take his medication.
8
Because of the schools' refusal to administer the drug in the prescribed
amount after being presented with a letter from a doctor, other medical
literature, and an offer to sign a waiver of liability, the parents of both
students brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and Rehabilitation Act (RHA). 9 In both cases the Eighth Circuit sided with
the schools stating that the discrimination was not based on the students'
disabilities. 0 The court noted in the DeBord case that Kelly could have
come home early from school, and so the parents' decision to allow her
to stay at school came with its consequences." Thus, complaining about
having to go to the school to administer the student's medication was
inappropriate. This illustration is not meant to suggest that the schools in
each of these cases are at fault for discriminating against disabled students.
Whether or not the Eighth Circuit's analysis is appropriate is debatable, but
it is not the subject of this article. Because of the nature of public education
and funding issues already facing our nation's schools, such high standards
are often necessary because the alternatives are too costly. These cases
demonstrate the difficult and task that disabled children face in fighting
against the status quo and what kind of affects these small educational
decisions have on the lives of these kids and their parents.
The problem in these cases is the inflexible nature of the schools'
policies and not the bad intent of the school officials. The policies inhibit
13 Id. at I 104.
14 Id.
15 Davis, 104 F3d at 2o5.
16 Id.
17 Id.
i8 Id.
19 DeBord, 126 F 3 d at 1104; Davis, 104 F3d at 205.
2o Debord, 126 F3d at 1 io5; Davis, 104 F3d at 2o6.
21 DeBord, 126 F.3d at 1104, 1 io6.
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students from participating with their peers in various sorts of school
projects and activities, unless parents are willing and able to make the
necessary sacrifices. The solution left to the parents is to go to the schools
themselves and administer the drug to their children."2 The inconvenience
and embarrassment caused to the child and the parents is outweighed by
the schools' prerogative to do as they wish. Such deference is usually given
to school officials in these and other contexts because allowing parents
to second guess every decision of school officials would be costly and
inefficient. Thus, the task for Congress is to enact legislation that protects
the rights of disabled individuals while allowing school officials to have the
freedom that they need to operate in their positions.
B. Congressional Legislation
The first effort by Congress to address the rights of handicapped children
to receive an education was in 1966 when it established a grant program
"for the purpose of assisting the States in the initiation, expansion, and
improvement of programs and projects... for the education of handicapped
children." 3 That Act was later repealed in 1970 by the Education of the
Handicapped Act. 4 Both Acts contained specific guidelines regarding the
use of grant money, and were aimed at encouraging states to train officials
and develop resources for educating the handicapped."
In 1973 Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act (RHA).16 This Act-
while geared primarily towards preventing disability discrimination in the
work place-provided that services should be provided to handicapped
students to prepare them forgainful employment. 7 In order to conform more
closely to the congressional intent and to correct any misunderstandings
that may have arisen, numerous amendments have been adopted, but the
purpose of the Act remains the same. 8
In 1975 Congress enacted the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA). 9 For years this law provided the basis for most lawsuits
22 See Davis, io4 F3d at 20 5 .
23 Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-750, § 161, 8o Stat. 1191, 1204 (1966).
24 Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.
91-23o, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (1970).
25 See id.; Amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, § 161,
8o Stat. at 1204.
26 Act of Sept. 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (973).
27 Id. at § 2().
28 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-1 io, Title X, § 1076(u)(2), 115
Stat. 1425 (2001).
29 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(c), 89
Stat. 773, 775 (1975) ("It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children
have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special
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regarding the discrimination of disabled students in schools. Congress later
renamed the law the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
30
which superseded the EAHCA, and provided for greater protection and
more extensive awards in these cases.3 This law was passed to further
"ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education," and that each student's educational program
be "designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further
education, employment, and independent living. '32 The IDEA is different
from the RHA and ADA (to be discussed subsequently) in that it provides
more detailed guidelines for what processes school officials should use to
assure that handicapped individuals are accommodated before they begin
school. For example, the statute requires that school officials make an
Individual Education Plan (IEP) for each disabled student who meets the
requirements to be deemed disabled.33 This IEP outlines the detailed
steps that the school will take to accommodate the disabled student.
In 1990, Congress provided further safeguards to disabled individuals
in school and in the work place by enacting the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). This law was viewed as necessary "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities," and "to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities."' 34
To succeed in a discrimination case under the RHA and ADA, a student
must prove that (1) the plaintiff is a person with a disability under the statute;
(2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified for participation in the program; and
(3) the plaintiff is being excluded from participation in or being denied the
benefits of a program, or being subjected to discrimination by reason of his
disability under the ADA, and "solely" by reason of his disability under the
RHA.3 The RHA requires an additional element, that the defendant be an
entity that receives federal funds.
36
education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights
of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, to assist States and
localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the
effectiveness of efforts to educate handicapped children").
30 20 U.S.C. § 140o(a) (997).
31 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
32 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(i)(A) (2oo6).
33 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (zoo6).
34 Americans with Disabilities Act of I99O, Pub. L. No. 101-336 § z(b)(i)-(2), 104 Stat.
327, 329 (1990).
35 See Mattox v. Univ. of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995); Monette v. Elcc.
Data Sys. Corp., 90 F3d 1173, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1996).
36 29 U.S.C. 794(a) (2000). This element of the RHA is not contested in any of the cases
analyzed in this Note.
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Since the enactment of the RHA and ADA these laws have been
invoked by disabled students in a variety of circumstances. Because of
the similarities in the laws, the Sixth Circuit has said that "the purpose,
scope, and governing standards of the acts are largely the same, cases
construing one statute are instructive in construing the other."37 The result
of construing these cases similarly has resulted in the importation of the
"solely" requirement into claims involving the ADA. Cases where school
officials may have had mixed motives (where the decision regarding the
disabled student was only partially based on the student's disability) would
be dismissed because the discrimination was not "solely" based on the
student's disability. While this is contrary to the statutory language, the
Sixth Circuit has recognized the issue and recent cases seem to indicate
that an en banc decision could change how the court analyses the ADA and
RHA.3 s
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW
A. Monahan v. Nebraska
In the late 1970s, the parents of two handicapped children, Daniel
Monahan and Maria Rose, became upset over the inadequate education
that they thought their children were receiving. The parents then brought
a discrimination action on their behalf under Section 504 of the RHA and
the EAHCA. Maria Rose had been attending Beveridge Junior High School
in Omaha, Nebraska, where she spent half of her time in special education
classes, and the other half in regular classes with her non-handicapped
peers.39 The school board decided that Maria's placement at Beveridge was
not helping her progress, and that she would receive a more "appropriate
education" if transferred to the Nebraska School for the Deaf.4° Maria's
parents disagreed with the decision of the board and instigated a proceeding
to have the board's suggestion evaluated by a hearing officer. 1 The hearing
officer found that the board's suggested placement was appropriate, and
37 Doe v. Woodford County Bd. of Educ., 213 E3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. zooo) (internal
citations omitted).
38 See Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F3d 357, 364 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)
(here the court recognized the differing language but stated that it was bound by precedent);
Salmi v. Sec. of Health and Human Servs., 774 Fzd 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) ("A panel of this
Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling
authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires
modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision").
39 Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F. Supp. 1074, Io8i (D.Neb. 198o).
40 Id.
41 Id.
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the Nebraska Commissioner of Education "adopted verbatim the report of
the hearing officer. ' 4 Maria's parents then filed suit in federal court.
"Daniel [Monahan] attended the Madonna School, a private elementary
school for the mentally retarded," also located in Omaha, Nebraska. 43 The
Omaha School District had paid for his education for the previous three
years, but when Daniel was placed in a wheelchair and the Madonna
School could no longer accommodate his needs, a disagreement about
his placement arose.' His parents and the nearby Millard School District
suggested George Norris Elementary School-located in the Millard
District-as an appropriate placement.4 Omaha School District officials
agreed that George Norris would be an appropriate placement, but they
refused to pay for Daniel's education there, and suggested their own
Hartman Elementary as a substitute.46 Daniel's parents chose to send
him to George Norris at their own expense, and brought an action in court
choosing to forego the hearing process because they believed that Daniel
"could not receive an impartial hearing under Nebraska Law."47
The main issue on appeal dealt with the administrative appeal procedure
that had been implemented by statute in Nebraska. The statute gave the
Nebraska Commissioner of Education authority to review decisions made
by hearing officers on appeals filed by parents. 48 The plaintiffs claimed that
this provision was in conflict with the statement in the EAHCA which said
that a decision made by an impartial hearing officer was final. 49 However,
the Nebraska legislature amended the provision to take away such power
from the Commissioner. 0 The district court therefore held that the case
was moot.5" The Eighth Circuit dismissed the case without prejudice, but
because the case could be re-litigated the court offered a few words of
dicta "for the guidance of the District Court and the parties" if they were
to pursue claims again under the RHA and EAHCA. 2
The court warned the lower court against substituting its own judgment
for the judgment of educational professionals when evaluating "educational
decisions." 3 The court suggested that if the school officials involved
42 Id.
43 Id. at io8z.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at o82-83.
48 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-662 (1978).
49 20 U.S.C. §1415(b) (2oo6).
50 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-662 (Cum. Supp. 198o) (current code section-Neb. Rev. St. §
79-1163).
51 Rose v. Nebraska, 530 F. Supp. 295, 301-02 (D. Neb. 1981).
52 Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 E2d 1164, 1 170 (8th Cir. 1982).
53 Id. at 1171.
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"exercised professional judgment," a plaintiff would need to prove "bad
faith or gross misjudgment" to overcome the deference that should be given
to school officials.14 "An evaluation, in other words, is not discriminatory
merely because a court would have evaluated the child differently."5
The Eighth Circuit saw it as its "duty to harmonize the [RHA] and the
EAHCA to the fullest extent possible,"5 6 the court saw the new standard as
striking the "proper balance between the rights of handicapped children,
the responsibilities of state educational officials, and the competence of
courts to make judgments in technical fields."57 While the court was merely
giving instruction to the lower court if the case was brought again, the
instruction has been used by many courts in a wide variety of circumstances
and has led to the spreading of the suggested bad faith/gross misjudgment
standard.
B. The Eighth Circuit Continues to Affirm Monahan
The Eighth Circuit has continued to uphold the bad faith/gross
misjudgment standard. After enduring some criticism, the court held its
ground in 1996 in Heidemann v. Rother.s8 In that case, Cherry Heidemann
was severally mentally retarded, and had several other serious disabilities.5 9
A physical therapist associated with the school district had suggested a
blanket wrapping technique to calm and comfort Cherry when she would
get physically out of control at school. 6° The claim arose because at two
different times the plaintiff's mother had found her on the floor wrapped
so tightly that she had to recruit help to free her daughter.6' The mother
asserted that she never agreed to allow such wrapping and that allowing the
school to do so was a violation of her rights under the RHA.61 The district
court denied the school's motion for summary judgment, but on appeal
the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded finding insufficient proof of bad
faith or gross misjudgment, and thus grounds for summary judgment.
63
The Eighth Circuit no longer limited the phrase to dicta but showed
its commitment to the standard by using it to dispose of several cases
thereafter.6" In the Hoekstra case the plaintiff, a student with a disability
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1170.
56 Id. at 1171.
57 Id.
58 Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1032 (8th Cir. 1996).
59 Id. at 1025.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1026.
62 Id. at 1032.
63 Id.
64 See Hoekstra ex re/. Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 103 E3d 624,626-27 (8th Cit.
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that made it difficult to go up and down stairs, had asked for a key to the
elevator in the school.6" The school recognized the validity of the request
and allowed her to use the elevator with an adult while the school developed
procedures for safe operation. 66 Nearly two months after the request was
made, the school finally said that the procedures had been established;
however, the school waited another six weeks to give the plaintiff a key.
67
The district court found no bad faith or gross misjudgment on the part of
the school and granted the school's motion for summary judgment, which
the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
68
The Minnesota District Court in Moubry v. Independent School
District 696, stated that "No amount of claimed violation of the Federal
regulations will relieve the plaintiff from his burden to show bad faith
or gross misjudgment. "69 Joe Moubry and his mother had disputed the
appropriateness of the reading program provided to Joe by the school
district and whether or not his Individual Education Plan was established
in accord with the IDEA.7" The school district argued that the alleged
violations of the IDEA's procedural requirements were not prejudicial and
that the reading program they provided was adequate.71 The school district
won at each level of the administrative process and the district court agreed
with the hearing officers granting summary judgment using the standard of
Monahan as controlling.7"
C. Acceptance by Other Circuits
In 1984 the D.C. Circuit cited Monahan with approval and appeared to
adopt the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard.73 Pierce Lunceford was
a severally handicapped student who had been placed in a hospital that
provided medical as well as educational services.7 4 After a time, the hospital
decided that Pierce could be discharged because they felt that he no longer
needed the medical services of the hospital.7" Pierce's surrogate parent
asked that Pierce not be moved until his parent's consent for the change in
placement could be obtained, and the district court agreed, enjoining the
1996); Todd v. Elkins Sch. Dist. No. 1o, 149 E3d 1188(8th Cir. 1998) (unpublished decision).
65 Hoekstra, 103 F3d at 626.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 626-27.
69 Moubry v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 696, 9 F Supp. zd io86, i i 1 (D. Minn. 1998).
70 Id. at 1092-94.
71 See generally Moubry, 9 F Supp. 2d io86.
72 Id. at I1o, 1113.
73 Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 Fd 1577, 158o (D.C. Cir. 1984).
74 Id. at 1579.
75 Id.
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hospital from discharging him.76 The court of appeals disagreed with the
lower court and stated its agreement with the Monahan court. The court
held that the hospital was not an agency for purposes of the act and that
Lunceford had not provided adequate evidence of discrimination."
Although waiting sixteen years after the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Monahan, the Fourth Circuit adopted the bad faith/gross misjudgment
standard in Sellers v. SchoolBoard of City of Mannassas.78 Kristopher Sellers's
parents claimed that their son's poor standardized test scores should have
alerted school officials of the need to evaluate him for possible learning
disabilities ... 9 Because he was not evaluated, his parents claimed that
he was denied a free appropriate public education under the IDEA,
and discriminated against under the RHA.80 Sellers was only seeking
compensatory and punitive damages because the educational issues had
already been resolved with the school in a settlement.8 The district
court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed that holding.8 The court stated its agreement with the bad
faith/gross misjudgment standard in its analysis and dismissal of Sellers'
discrimination claim under the RHA.83
In 1999 the Eastern District of Virginia handed down a decision in Doe
v. Arlington County SchoolBoard, citing Monahan and asserting that to prove
discrimination "[slomething far more than a mere denial of free appropriate
education is required." 4 Jane Doe suffered from mental retardation and
ADHD, and her parents were disputing the placement decision of the board
to provide fewer services than they believed their daughter was entitled to
receive. 5 At each stage of the administrative proceeding the officers sided
with the school board, and Doe did not receive any more sympathy from the
Eastern District of Virginia 6 The court cited the standard as authoritative
and was not dissuaded by its acknowledgment that "[tihe bad faith/gross
misjudgment standard is extremely difficult to meet, especially given the
great deference to which local school officials' educational judgments are
entitled."87
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1579-8o.
78 Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998).
79 Id. at 525-26.
8o Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 525.
83 Id. at 529.
84 Doe v. Arlington County Sch. Board, 41 E Supp.2d 599, 6o9 (E.D. Va. 1999).
85 Id. at 6o 1-02.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 6o9.
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In 2006 the Fourth Circuit confirmed its continuing acceptance of the
Monahan standard in the case of County School Board of York County, Virginia
v. A.L. s A.L. had Down Syndrome and other disabilities, and there was a
disagreement between experts about his need for a particular type of physical
therapy.89 The school's expert had evaluated him in 2001 and decided that
the therapy was not necessary, but an expert hired by the student's family
had concluded in 2003 that the therapy was necessary.' The court actually
sided with the student in this case, upholding the decision of the hearing
officer and trial court that A.L.'s Individual Education Plan was deficient.
9 '
However, the court based its decision on procedural requirements of the
IDEA and did not reach A.L.'s claim under the RHA, but in a footnote
the court stated its continuing adherence to the Monahan standard in
RHA cases.9 The court apparently recognized that even though it agreed
with the student, it could not overcome the bad faith/gross misjudgment
standard and thus had to base its decision on procedural violations of the
IDEA.
D. Treatment by the Sixth Circuit
For years the standard put forth in Monahan had rarely, if ever, been used in
the Sixth Circuit. The case history in the Sixth Circuit reveals a few recent
cases that have used the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard in a much
more significant way. Whether these decisions are a mere aberration or an
indication of a shift in the circuit will only be revealed with time.
In 2003, the Sixth Circuit handed down a decision in N.L. ex rel. Mrs.
C. v. Knox County Schools, stating that "[t]o prove discrimination in the
education context, courts have held that something more than a simple
failure to provide a free appropriate public education must be shown." 93
The court cited to the Monahan case as directly supporting its argument.
94
The Sixth Circuit remanded for other reasons,9' and thus the language of
the Monahan standard was not dispositive of the case. In the case, Mrs. C.
had disagreed with the school's finding that her daughter was not entitled
to any special education services.96 The administrative officers agreed with
the school district, but the district court sent the matter back to the school
88 County School Board v.A.L., 194 F. App'x 173 (4th Cir. 2006).
89 Id. at 174-75.
90 Id.
9
i Id. at 182.
92 Id. at i8z n.io.
93 N.L. ex ril. Mrs. C. v. Knox County Sch., 3I5 E3d 688,695 (6th Cir. 2003).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 696.
96 Id. at 689.
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because it found that proper procedures had not been followed.97 The Sixth
Circuit remanded for other reasons, but stated that the plaintiff's argument
would not satisfy the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard because no
substantive harm was demonstrated.9
In another unpublished case from 2003,
99 the Sixth Circuit concluded
that a Michigan school district's decision as to which reading program to
provide a dyslexic student did not violate the RHA and ADA."° Douglas
Campbell suffered from dyslexia and had been assigned to the district's
standard remedial reading program over his parent's objection and
suggestion that he be placed in a private tutoring program.101 The court
cited Monahan in its discussion of what must be proven by a plaintiff in
order for the claim of discrimination to be presented to the jury.2°2 The
court said that the plaintiff needed to show that the program was not a
"reasonable accommodation" and that the RHA "further requires.. .that
either bad faith or gross misjudgment must be shown...."' 3 The court
garnered support for its decision because earlier that same year it had cited
Monahan "with approval.""°
After years of using a totally different standard, switching to this standard
in the summer of 2003 is a perplexing occurrence. An examination of
these two cases reveals that Judge Eric L. Clay sat on both panels.1"5 Also,
the cases were published just four weeks apart.'06 Greater access to the
process behind these two decisions may provide some insight as to why the
Monahan standard was used in such a way during this brief time.
These cases seem to be but a blip on the radar in the Sixth Circuit case
history. However, recently the Monahan standard has made a comeback,
and this time the standard is much more in the forefront and is winning
the support of new judges and lawmakers. An addition to Ohio Education
Law suggests that Monahan provides authority for heightening the standard
to prove educational professionals were guilty of discrimination against
disabled students.
10 7
97 Id.
98 Id. at 695.
99 Campbell v. Board of Educ., 58 F App'x 162 (6th Cir. 2003).
ioo Id. at 168.
io Id. at 163.
102 Id. at 167.
103 Id. (internal citations omitted).
104 Id. (citing N.L. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Knox County Sch., 315 F3d 688, 695 (6th Cir.
2003)).
105 In N.L., Clay sat along with Judge Norris and District Judge O'Meara from the
Eastern District of Michigan who sat by designation. In Campbell, Judge Clay sat with Judges
Keith and Krupansky. In neither case did Clay write an opinion.
io6 N.L. was published January 16, 2003, and Campbell February 13 of that same year.
107 Oh. Sch. L. § 28:34 (2007).
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An even more sweeping attempt to insulate educational professionals
occurred in the 2006 case of S.S. v. Eastern Kentucky University,108 decided in
the Eastern District of Kentucky. In this case the court stated the Monahan
standard' °9 even though there was no professional judgment involved.
"[Tihe core of all of Plaintiff's allegations is the failure of [the Defendants]
to adequately respond to [certain] incidents and maintain a safe educational
environment for Plaintiff.""'  No program or educational decision was
involved. The plaintiff claimed to have been assaulted by his classmates and
that defendants were guilty of discrimination by inadequately responding
and failing to stop the harassment."' The court gave other grounds for
dismissing the case on summary judgment but stated its agreement with
the standard for use in future cases.
Prior to this case, the Monahan standard had only been applied when
an educational professional had actually made a judgment, such as
deciding between remedial reading programs "' or when a tutor would be
provided." 3 This case was of a much different variety. However, the court
attempted to establish Monahan as an even broader standard. The court
stated that the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard had been applied
"uniformly" by courts, "finding its origin in the statutory language.""' 4
The court then cited the unpublished Campbell case and an Eighth Circuit
case from 1999115 to apparently show how "uniform" the applications had
been. Further questioning the court's discussion of Monahan in the S.S.
case is the case of Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School decided soon after
by the Michigan Court of Appeals." 6 While the court in S.S. referred to the
standard as being "uniformly" applied, the Buck court saw the standard as
"clearly dicta" thirty-two days later.'' 7
It appears that there may still be some debate regarding the appropriate
standard in ADA/RHA discrimination cases. The bad faith/gross
misjudgment standard admittedly has its merits, such as eliminating the
chance that opposing parties will call numerous experts to testify regarding
the advantages of one program over another. There is also something to be
said for the importance of giving deference to the judgments of academic
professionals and showing "great respect for the faculty's professional
io8 S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 431 F. Supp. zd 718 (E.D. Ky. 2oo6).
1o9 Id. at 729.
11o Id. at 722-23.
iii Id. at 723, 724, 730-31.
112 Campbell v. Board of Educ., 58 F. App'x 162 (6th Cir. 2003).
113 Hoekstra ex rel. Hoekstra v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 283, 103 E3d 624 (8th Cir. 1996).
114 S.S., 431 F.Supp.zd at 730.
115 Smith ex rel. Townsend v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 184 F3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999).
116 Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 725 N.W.2d 485 (Mich. Ct. App. zoo6).
117 Id. at 489.
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judgment." ' However, allowing educational professionals to do nothing
when they hear reports of discrimination would be a great extension of an
already non-statutorily supported standard.
E. Insulating Educational Professionals
The standard enunciated in Monahan insulates educational professionals
by requiring "extreme fault." 119  "The effect of the bad faith/gross
misjudgment threshold is to deny students with disabilities relief under the
ADA unless their schools have acted egregiously."'1 0 Even if a plaintiff were
to establish that the school had failed to provide a free appropriate public
education, a court applying the Monahan standard would ask for more. "A
mere failure to provide" such services is not enough in the words of the
Monahan court, even acknowledging that such services are "required" by
the EACHA (now IDEA). This cannot be seen as being consistent with
the congressional "mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." ' Although hypothetically possible, proving
that state officials acted in such a way as to satisfy this standard has proved
to be an impossible task for those who have run up against it."3
As one can see from an examination of these cases, a remarkable
number are dismissed on motions for summary judgment.1 14 The bad faith/
gross misjudgment standard is so high, not only are these cases remarkably
difficult to win, but they are just as difficult to get to a jury. This gives
school officials all the power in deciding what constitutes a free appropriate
public education for disabled students.
As if the imposition of the Monahan standard were not enough, courts
have expanded the standard to include cases that do not even deal with
placement decisions in the education context, but just refer to the acts
of educational professionals.1 15 "This judicially-imposed liability buffer,
although it is firmly ensconced in the case law, lacks any statutory basis and
goes against the grain of the ADA."
1
1
6
I18 Kaltenburger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F3d 432, 436 (6th Cit. 1998)
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
119 Simmons, supra note 1o, at 823.
120 Id. at 822.
121 Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 Ezd 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982).
122 42 U.S.C. § 21o(b)() (2000).
123 After extensive research, the Author can find no case in which a court ruled that
the "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard had been satisfied. See supra notes 58-I 18
and accompanying text for analysis of cases that did not satisfy the standard according to the
reviewing court.
124 See supra notes 58-1 18 and accompanying text.
125 S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 431 E Supp.zd 718 (E.D. Ky. 2oo6).
126 Simmons, supra note 1 o, at 822.
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III. THE STATUTORY ALTERNATIVE
Contrary to the belief of some courts, the standards under the ADA and
RHA as outlined in the respective statutes still require a pretty high
standard to implicate educational professionals. The plaintiff's prima facie
case does not necessarily include a showing of discriminatory intent,17 but
the statutes state that the discrimination must be "by reason of her or his
disability." '128 According to Black's Law Dictionary, discrimination means
"[d]ifferential treatment.. .a failure to treat all persons equally when no
reasonable distinction can be found between those favored and those not
favored."'' " Both the ADA and RHA state that disability is not a reasonable
distinction, and that any differential treatment of a handicapped individual
must be based on some other distinction. 3 ° The following two cases from
the Sixth Circuit illustrate this point.
Instances of discrimination against disabled individuals have been
upheld by the Sixth Circuit because the discrimination was not based
"solely" on the disability. 3' In one case, a student was not allowed to
play basketball after participating for eight semesters because of a rule
promulgated by the state athletic association which stated that no student
may play beyond the eight semester mark. 32 The court held that this
"neutral rule" was appropriate because it treated all students the same, and
therefore while it may have stopped the student from participating further
in high school athletics, he was not being discriminated against because of
his disability, but rather because of his age.'33
In another case, a student at an optometry school was required to pass
a proficiency exam which required the use of four instruments which
the student had trouble using because of a "neurological condition."'-'
The student argued that the requirement was not necessary to being an
optometrist because the requirement was only a year old and the four
instruments were not even used at the school's optometry clinic.135 The
district court disagreed in light of the fact that the instruments were seeing
i27 Se id.
128 29 U.S.C. § 794 (zooo), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
129 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 500 (8th ed. 2004).
130 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §12132 (2000).
13I See Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.zd 570, 574 (6th Cir. 1988); Tuck v. HCA
Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 7 E3d 465, 473-74 (6th Cir.1993); Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
857 F.zd 1073, i079 (6th Cir.1988); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 64 F.3d
1026, 1033 (6th Cir. 1995); McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 19 F.3d 453,
46o-461 (6th Cir. 1997).
132 McPherson, 1 19 F 3 d at 455.
133 Id. at 463.
134 Doherty, 862 Ed at 574.
135 Id.
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more common usage and the school should be allowed to set minimum
standards of competency for its students in particular areas and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.
136
Proving that there is no bad faith/gross misjudgment in these cases is not
needed because they can be dismissed by relying on the statutory language.
courts' reliance on the clear language of the statute provides another
avenue for courts to decline relief to disabled students. The interpretation
of the word "solely" in the RHA's requirement of discrimination based
on disability137 is something that should be watched carefully to prevent
injustice. All a court would have to find to deny relief to a disabled
child is any other reason-in addition to the child's disability-for the
discrimination. This could be something like age or minimum competency
requirements, as outlined above. It would be a mistake for a court to deny
relief when discrimination is based "mostly" but not "solely" on disability,
but the statute seems to provide support for the statement.3'
In order to grant relief, courts are required to find that educational
professionals failed to accommodate an individual because that individual
had a disability. The Supreme Court-in the same year that Monahan
was decided-provided some help to courts in determining whether
discrimination has occurred, and whether a cause of action should lie in
the case of Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley. 139 The court had been called upon to interpret and to clarify the
EAHCA's requirement to provide a "free appropriate public education."1
The court developed a two step process to determine if the statute had
been satisfied. First, the educational professionals must have followed the
procedures outlined by the statute, and second, the decision must have
been "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational
benefits."14'
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that courts should show "great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment."'42 The Court approved of
the "widest discretion in making judgments as to academic performance,"' 43
to prevent courts from second guessing educational professionals. The
Supreme Court, however, has never suggested that deference should be
absolute or require bad faith. Further, "neither the language, purpose, nor
136 Id.
137 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
138 See Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 E 3 d 357, 364 n.Z (6th Cir. 2007)
(The court recognized the differing language but stated that the court was bound by the
precedents).
139 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
140 20 U.S.C. § 1412(l) (2000).
141 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-207.
142 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
143 Id.
[Vol. 96
SPECIAL EDUCATION DISCRIMINATION
history of § 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation
on all recipients of federal funds."144
Thomas Simmons, in his article "The ADA Prima Facie Plaintiff:
A Critical Overview of Eighth Circuit Case Law," suggested that a
discriminatory impact theory or an accommodation discrimination theory
would be appropriate because the students are being denied treatment
that is usually viewed as a reasonable accommodation. 145 In his article,
Professor Simmons analyzes the developments within the Eighth Circuit
that have greatly narrowed a plaintiffs chances for success in these cases,
with one of them being the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard.
Simmons also suggested that plaintiffs could "turn to the implementing
regulations which impose an affirmative duty on public entities to make
reasonable policy modifications when necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability."' 46 Simmons has noted however that "without
fail . . . the Eighth Circuit has denied them relief,"'147 and with the
developments in the Sixth Circuit, one could conclude that relief would
be similarly denied.
The IDEA charges each state with "acquiring and disseminating
to teachers and administrators ... information derived from educational
research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where
appropriate, promising educational practices and materials.' 48 Each court
must, therefore, "be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable
educational methods upon the States."'149  The statutes provide clear
language, and the Supreme Court has added some necessary guidance
to allow courts to give deference to state officials, while accomplishing
the "goal of providing full educational opportunities to all handicapped
children." 150
Courts have never read the requirements to prove discrimination under
the ADA and RHA to be an easy task. Disabled students have been denied
relief in all but the extraordinary set of circumstances. This is no doubt in
line with the intent of Congress to allow educational professionals to do
their jobs and make appropriate decisions. The statute is difficult to satisfy,
but it is not impossible. However, every decision that cites Monahan, and
further entrenches the heightened standard, demonstrates how far some
courts have strayed from the clear dictates of the statutes. The fact that
the phrase "bad faith/gross misjudgment" is not anywhere in the relevant
144 Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,411 (979).
145 Simmons, supra note to, at 824 (internal citations omitted).
146 Id. (citing 28 C.ER. § 35.13o(b)(7) (1998)).
147 Simmons, supra note io, at 824.
148 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3) (2000).
149 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207
(1982).
150 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2000).
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statute should not be overlooked, and at least as one court has noted "such
a requirement should not be imputed into the language."'51
CONCLUSION
Courts should not be allowed to change the standards for disability
discrimination in these types of settings without providing more than
just a superficial mention of the history of such a questioned standard.'
One case can establish a precedent that will be relied on by other courts
when dealing with similar issues. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has only briefly mentioned Monahan once, in Luncefordv. District
of Columbia Board of Education. s3 However, that decision has been treated
significantly in the Sellers case from the Fourth Circuit, and the N.L. case
in the Sixth."M So while a court may cite to a case such as Monahan only
to suggest that such a standard might be appropriate under the right set
of circumstances, other courts may inflate its original language to imply a
much more sweeping acceptance.
One cannot help but wonder why the standard of care for educational
professionals ought to be so low when working with handicapped students.
Congress clearly saw a need-and continues to see the need-to protect
the rights of the disabled by passing these laws. Lowering the standard of
care to levels lower than the statutes proscribe render the language of the
statutes and their purposes void. Such practices could lead to problems in
the future if school districts do not provide adequate programs, and thereby
challenge disabled students and their parents to overthrow the standard
procedure of allowing school districts to more or less do as they wish.
"Contrary to the fears of some educators and educational critics, few
learning-disabled students sue their [schools] over a failure to be provided
the accommodations they believe they require. '"' 5 So while courts and
state education officials may fear hypothetical outcomes and encourage us
151 Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp.zd 1124, 1146 (D. Kan. zooo) ("such a requirement
should not be imputed into the language of the Rehabilitation Act").
152 See Howell v. Waterford Public Schs., 731 F.Supp. 1314 (E.D. Mich. 199o) (severely
criticizing the Alonahan standard as "dicta" and not appropriate in these types of cases). Other
courts have also criticized the standard. See Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 725
N.W.zd 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F Supp. 2d 1124, 1146 (D. Kan.
zooo) ("such a requirement could not be imputed into the language of the Rehabilitation
Act"); David H. v. Spring Branch Independent Sch. Dist., 569 E Supp. 1324 (S.D. Texas 1983);
Byrnes v. Riles, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1170 (1984); and Simmons, supra note io, at 822-823.
153 Lunceford v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 745 F2d 1577, 158o (D.C. Cir. 1984).
154 See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 E3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998); N.L. ex r'l. Mrs.
C. v. Knox County Sch., 315 F3d 688,695 (6th Cir. 2003).
155 Suzanne Abram, Reasonable Accommodations for the Learning-Disabled University
Students Under the ADA, 28J. L. & EDUC. 121, 127 (999).
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to lobby with them for a higher standard, it is important to remember the
purposes for which these laws protecting disabled students were enacted.
Providing "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"'' 6 will become
outdated prose if the bad faith/gross misjudgment standard is allowed to
stand. Protecting the rights of handicapped students, and assuring that
"all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate public
education""5 7 should remain the goal of courts in these cases. It seems that
some courts, along with many state officials, have "greatly exaggerated" a
problem'58 that presents no real threat to educational enterprise as we know
it, but provides a good template for judicial overreaching and lowering
statutory standards.
156 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
157 20 U.S.C. § 14oo(d)(I)(A) (zooo).
158 Abram, supra note 155, at 1z8.
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